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We use hedonic price models to estimate how much households are willing to pay to avoid violent 
crime in the city of Bogotá. We find that households living in the highest socioeconomic level 
(stratum 6) pay up to 7.2% of their house values in order to prevent average homicide rates from 
increasing in one standard deviation. Households in stratum 5 pay up to 2.4% of their house values 
to prevent homicide rates from increasing. The results indicate the willingness to pay for security by 
households in Bogotá, and additionally reveal that a pure public good like security, ends up creating 
urban private markets. These markets imply different levels of access to public goods among the 
population, and actually, the exclusion of the poorest. We find, as well, evidence of negative 
capitalization of the rate of attacks against life, and positive capitalization of the presence of police 
authority.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Quantifying the costs of crime and violence is a useful exercise because it contributes to the 
quality of the public discussion about a fundamental problem, and because it helps policy 
makers both prioritize and design cost-effective policies to diminish the adverse effects of 
crime. Estimates of the cost of violence are usually based on health care expenditures and 
losses to national economies coming from (among other things) days away from work, law 
enforcement expenditures, and unrealized investments.
1 
 
Nonetheless, these estimations do not usually consider the cost posed by crime and violence 
to households within cities, in terms of both the different risks they face and the coping 
mechanisms used by them. Specifically, within a city, the variation of crime and violence 
rates across neighborhoods provides a market that is serviced by security agencies created 
for that purpose. Households often end up paying for security in the form of higher property 
and rental values.   
 
There are two relevant issues concerning the market for neighborhood safety (the amenity 
under consideration in this paper) that one should consider. First, one must quantify the cost 
of this amenity to households. Second, one must identify the impossibility of most 
households to meet this cost. Even though many households are willing to pay to avoid 
crime, just a few are actually able to do, thus making neighborhood safety (a supposedly 
pure public good) subject to private markets, and therefore to exclusion.  
 
In this paper, we study the aforementioned issues for the city of Bogotá, Colombia. We find 
that households living in the highest socioeconomic stratum (stratum 6) are paying up to 
7.2% of their house values in order to prevent average homicide rates from increasing in 
one standard deviation. For their part, households in stratum 5 are paying up to 2.4% of 
their house values to prevent homicide rates from increasing. These results indicate the 
willingness to pay for security by households in Bogotá, and, additionally, show the 
emergence of urban private markets for security. These markets imply different levels of 
access to public goods among the population, and actually, the exclusion of the poorest. 
 
We now proceed to describe the levels of crime in Colombia and some previous work on 
the topic. Then we describe our data and present the empirical methodology and 
identification strategy. Finally, we present the results and offer some general conclusions. 
 
2.  Crime in Colombia and Previous Work 
 
Figure 1 shows that in the late 1990s the homicide rate in Colombia was one of the highest 
in the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region.
2 The Colombian rate was about six 
times as high as the average rate worldwide and about three times as high as the average 
                                                 
1 Other economic and personal costs are much less quantifiable, like the ones coming from the pain and 
suffering of victims of violence. 
2 Numbers shown in Figure 1 correspond to the late 1990s for the case of countries (top graph) and to 2002 
for the case cities (bottom graph).    2
rate in the American continent taken as a whole. As of 2002, the homicide rate in the city of 
Bogotá was similar to that of other large Latin American cities, but it was lower than that of 
the most violent cities in the Colombia, namely Medellín and Cali. In recent years, the 
homicide rate in Bogotá has fallen precipitously, from a rate of nearly 80 deaths per 
100,000 people in 1993, to a rate of 20 per 100,000 in 2007 (Llorente and Rivas, 2005).  
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Krug et al. (2002), Gaviria and Pages (2002), and Llorente and Rivas (2005). 
 
A wide selection of literature deals with the overall cost of crime and violence (see Cohen 
and Rubio, 2007 for a recent review). For the case of the United States, Krug et al. (2002) 
argue that the overall cost due to gunshot wounds is close to US$ 130 billion, whereas the 
costs caused by stab wounds are close to US$ 50 billion. For the United Kingdom, 
Atkinson et al. (2005) find that common, moderate, and serious assaults cost about £5,300, 
£31,000, and £36,000 per average victim household per year, respectively. 
 
Among the studies seeking to estimate households’ willingness to pay for security, Cohen 
et al. (2004) use a contingent valuation methodology to find that a typical American 
household is willing to pay between US$100 and US$150 per year for a crime prevention 
program that reduces specific crimes by ten percent. The said amount increases according 
to the severity of crime: US$104 for burglaries and US$146 for murders. Previously, Cook 
and Ludwig (2000) and Ludwig and Cook (2001) argued that the average household is 
willing to pay as much as US$200 per year in order to reduce gun violence caused by 
criminals and juvenile delinquents by 30%. 
 
While studies that estimate hedonic price models have often included crime variables in the 
empirical estimations, the identification of causal effects of these variables has not been an 
explicit goal in most of the literature. Whereas Roback (1982) does not find a statistically 
significant coefficient of crime rates on log earnings, Gyourko and Tracy (1991) do find 
significant effects. Neither of them addresses explicitly the issue of causality. 
 
For Colombia, the only previous attempt to quantify distributional effects of crime 
variables is that of Gaviria and Velez (2001). These authors find that rich households are   4
more likely to be victims of property crime and kidnapping, and are therefore much more 
willing to modify their behavior for fear of crime: they feel unsafe, and will heavily invest 
in crime avoidance. The poorest are more likely to be victims of homicides and domestic 
violence. Other studies have focused on the overall economic cost caused by violence in 
Colombia. Trujillo and Badel (1998) estimate, for the early nineties, the gross cost of urban 
criminality and armed conflict in Colombia at 4.3% of GDP. Badel (1999) estimate, for the 
mid-nineties, the gross direct cost of violence and armed conflict at 4.5% of GDP. Londoño 
and Guerrero (2000) estimate the direct cost of violence on health (medical attention and 
lost years of life) and material losses (public and private security and justice) at 4.9% of 
GDP for a subset of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, and 11.4% of GDP in 
the case of Colombia. Furthermore, Londoño and Guerrero (2000) also estimate the indirect 
costs of violence (i.e., the effect on productivity, investment, work, and consumption) in 
9.2% of GDP for the same sample of LAC countries, and 13.3% of GDP for Colombia. 
These authors did not quantify the willingness of households to pay in order to avoid urban 
violence, as we do in this paper.  
 
Quite a few previous studies investigate the spatial patterns of crime in Colombia in general 
and in Bogotá in particular. Núñez and Sánchez (2001) find statistically significant spatial 
correlation between assaults, auto thefts, residential and commercial robberies. Similarly, 
Llorente et al. (2001) illustrate meticulously the spatial segregation of homicides in Bogotá, 
and, additionally, study its dynamics, finding that homicides are spatially very persistent; 
they take place mostly around the same areas of the city with different degrees of intensity. 
 
In what follows, we use the previous studies and provide some additional elements that, we 
believe, support the estimation strategy used in the calculation of the effects of homicide 
rates on house values and rents. We describe the data used in the estimation before 





We use data at the household level taken from the 2003 Encuesta de Calidad de Vida/ECV 
(Survey on Quality of Life). The ECV is carried out at approximately five-year intervals by 
Colombia’s Administrative Department of National Statistics, DANE.
4 The 2003 ECV (a 
LSMS survey) has detailed information about living conditions of households in Bogotá, 
with more than 12,000 households interviewed in all 19 sub-city urban areas known as 
localidades.
5 The ECV was purportedly designed to compute employment and 
                                                 
3 This section builds heavily on Medina et al. (2007). 
4 The survey was collected between June 6 and July 23 of 2003. Household members 18 and older were 
directly interviewed. 
5 See Medina et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the spatial data. 
6 Urban areas in Colombia are split into six socioeconomic strata: stratum one has the lowest socioeconomic 
levels and stratum six, the highest. The strata are used to target public service subsidies and other social 
programs (see Medina et al., 2007). To estimate in which socioeconomic stratum each house is classified, the 
local governments takes into account dwelling characteristics as well as neighborhood amenities. Based on 
this information, they aggregate neighborhoods into clusters of strata. The methodology allows houses in a 
cluster to belong to a stratum different to that of its cluster if characteristics are very different to those of its 
cluster.   5
unemployment rates at the level of the locality. Within each locality, households were 
randomly selected. In each locality, households from each of the six different strata used in 
Colombia for targeting social programs were included.
6 Map 1 illustrates the location of the 
poorest and richest households in the city: the former are located mostly in the northeast, 
and the latter mostly in the south and on the city’s periphery. 
 
We also use data from the 1993 Population Census in order to collect information at the 
census sector level. This information allows us to split Bogotá into more than 500 sectors, 
with an average population of about 12,000 inhabitants per sector (See divisions in Map 
2).
7 Most of the estimation is done at the level of the census sector.  
 
         Map 1. Socioeconomic Strata in Bogotá 
Table 1 presents all variables used in the 
estimation. Most households in Bogotá are 
located in socioeconomic strata 2 or 3 
(75%), and approximately 6% in strata 5 
and 6, or in stratum 1, respectively. 
Coverage of public utility services is very 
high in the city, with nearly 100% in 
electricity, and nearly 90% in fixed phone 
lines. We possess cadastral data for nearly 
70% of the households. Our variables 
related to crime include common thefts, 
aggravated assaults, residential and 
commercial robberies, auto thefts and 
homicides.
8 Figure 2 presents the 
distribution of the crime variables across 
census sectors. The figure shows that 
almost all distributions and in particular, 
those corresponding to common thefts 
(object thefts herein) and homicides are 
not entirely reliable. Figure 2 also presents 
the spatial distribution of the Police 
Centers of Immediate Attention, the CAIs. 
This distribution has the same shape as the distribution of the crime and violence variables. 
 
                                                 
5 See Medina et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the spatial data. 
6 Urban areas in Colombia are split into six socioeconomic strata: stratum one has the lowest socioeconomic 
levels and stratum six, the highest. The strata are used to target public service subsidies and other social 
programs (see Medina et al., 2007). To estimate in which socioeconomic stratum each house is classified, the 
local governments takes into account dwelling characteristics as well as neighborhood amenities. Based on 
this information, they aggregate neighborhoods into clusters of strata. The methodology allows houses in a 
cluster to belong to a stratum different to that of its cluster if characteristics are very different to those of its 
cluster. 
7 Figures of the 2005 Colombia Population Census have not yet  been made available. 
8 For the purpose of this study, we understand homicide as the activity by which one person kills another (Art. 
323 Penal Code); attacks against life, as harming a person’s body or health (Art. 332 Penal Code); and objects 










Cadastral data will be made available here on property values for close to 8,900 houses in 
Bogotá. In addition, we are able to provide the owners’ reported values for households 
claiming home ownership. Reported rent prices are available for houses with tenant 
households (how much do you pay?) and for those living in their own house (how much 
would you pay if the house were rented?). Figure 3 presents the distribution of property 
values. The distribution of property values obtained using only cadastral data is similar to 
the one obtained when reported rent values are used to complement cadastral data.  
   7
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Stratum 2 12,744 0.325 0.468
Stratum 3 12,744 0.434 0.496
Stratum 4 12,744 0.116 0.320
Stratum 5 12,744 0.030 0.170
Stratum 6 12,744 0.032 0.175
Cadastral House Value (as Opposed to Reported) 12,871 0.690 0.463
Number of rooms 12,771 3.37 1.52
Number of bathrooms 12,760 1.558 0.842
House with piped gas service 12,771 0.656 0.475
House with telephone 12,771 0.877 0.329
Good quality of electricity 12,746 0.899 0.302
Good quality of garbage collection 12,750 0.891 0.312
Water available 24 hrs a day 12,678 0.982 0.133
Water available every day of the week 12,771 0.967 0.178
Good quality of phone line 12,871 0.731 0.444
House with garden 12,771 0.419 0.493
House with court yard 12,771 0.046 0.210
House with garage  12,771 0.285 0.451
House with terrace 12,771 0.217 0.412
Parks in neighborhood 12,771 0.131 0.338
The house has suffered because of a natural disaster 12,771 0.046 0.209
House in area vulnerable to natural disasters 12,771 0.070 0.255
Factories in neighborhood 12,771 0.119 0.324
Garbage collector in neighborhood 12,771 0.030 0.172
Market places in neighborhood 12,771 0.070 0.255
Airport in neighborhood 12,771 0.037 0.188
Terminals of ground transportation in neighborhood 12,771 0.033 0.178
House close to open sewers 12,771 0.103 0.304
House close to high tension lines of electricity transmission 12,771 0.018 0.132
You feel safe in your neighborhood 12,771 0.680 0.466
Provision of water is inside the house 12,771 0.973 0.163
The kitchen is a individual room 12,771 0.960 0.195
Shower bath 12,771 0.974 0.160
House* 12,771 0.378 0.485
Walls material is any of: Brick, block, stone, polished wood  12,771 0.978 0.146
Floor material is any of: Marmol, parque, lacquered wood 12,771 0.084 0.277
Floor material is Carpet 12,771 0.133 0.339
Floor material is any of: Floor tile, vinyl, tablet, wood  12,771 0.595 0.491
Floor material is any of: Coarse wood, table, plank 12,771 0.054 0.227
Floor material is any of: Cement, gravilla, earth, sand 12,771 0.134 0.341
House with Toilet connected to the public sewerage 12,771 0.989 0.103
House with potable water service 12,771 0.985 0.120
Number of infantile shelters
 12,771 0.070 0.352
Number of asylums
 12,771 0.140 0.456
Number of convents
 12,771 0.260 0.888
Objects theft rate  12,861 0.869 6.088
Assaults rate  12,861 3.24 22.13
Residential and commercial assault rate  12,861 2.99 9.23
Cars theft rate  12,861 2.48 12.53
Crime rate  12,120 0.538 0.668
Land use  12,861 0.002 0.017
Attacks of FARC, ELN or other groups**
 12,871 0.232 0.422
Share of women heads of households  12,861 0.275 0.051  
   8
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Continuation) 
 Sources:  Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003, Real State Appraisal of 
Bogotá, National Police-DIJIN 2000, Paz Pública (2000). Colombian 
1993 Population Census. 
* Dummy variable equal to 1 if house, zero otherwise (apartment, etc.). 
** 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there have been attacks in census sector by 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, Ejército de 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Labor force Unemployment rate  12,871 3.89 1.01
Illiteracy rate  12,861 0.030 0.021
Average education  12,861 8.365 1.896
Index of Quality of Life***  12,871 82.12 7.09
Gini of education  12,861 0.051 0.013
Number of CAIS****  12,861 0.474 9.894
Number of medical centers  12,861 0.281 1.476
Number of private hospitals  12,861 0.243 1.384
Number of police headquarters  12,861 0.241 17.64
Number of local security funds  12,861 6.95 60.45
Number of public hospitals  12,861 0.572 19.630
Number of religious centers  12,861 1.12 3.45
Number of social welfare centers  12,861 2.30 7.39
Number of cultural centers  12,861 2.91 11.48
Number of prisons  12,861 0.032 0.966
Number of attacks against life  12,861 0.844 18.082
Number of attacks against wealth  12,861 1.30 22.17
Number of bars  12,861 1.179 18.727
Number of brothels  12,861 0.630 17.689
Number of casinos/places for bets  12,861 0.288 17.659
Number of places selling drugs/narcotics  12,861 0.879 20.300
Number of people 0-4 years old
 12,771 1,183 980
Number of people 5-9 years old
 12,771 1,156 929
Number of people 10-14 years old
 12,771 1,168 910
Number of people 15-19 years old
 12,771 1,092 793
Number of people 20-24 years old
 12,771 1,211 890
Number of people 25-29 years old
 12,771 1,217 898
Number of people 30-34 years old
 12,771 1,132 814
Number of people 35-39 years old
 12,771 898 638
Number of people 40-44 years old
 12,771 696 499
Number of people 45-49 years old
 12,771 506 352
Number of people 50-54 years old
 12,771 413 270
Number of people 55-59 years old
 12,771 299 186
Number of people 60 +   years old
 12,771 700 415
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI): Dependency  12,771 37.01 43.36
NBI: Accumulation  12,771 418.35 410.15
NBI: Dropouts  12,771 6.04 9.18
NBI: Public utility services  12,771 37.71 76.72
NBI: Housing in  12,771 69.09 97.20
NBI: NBI in Municipality where were born  12,871 26.86 17.34
NBI: NBI in Municipality where were born  12,871 0.097 0.296
Born in urban area 12,771 0.753 0.431
Share of women in household 12,771 0.535 0.268
Household with children 12,771 0.716 0.451
Age of mother minus age of oldest children 12,771 17.13 12.77
Logarithm of rent values 12,669 12.44 0.771
logarithm of cadastral house values 8,879 17.48 0.777
logarithm of cadastral or reported house values 10,845 17.50 0.792  9
Liberación Nacional, ELN, or other such illegal armed groups. 
*** A-
Theoretical estimation of QoL (See methodology in DNP, 1997). 
**** 
Centros de Atención Inmediata, CAIS: Centers of Immediate -Police- 
Attention. 
 At the census sector level. 
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Figure 3. Property and Rent Values 
 
Other variables  related to quality of life, like the index of quality of life, ICV; the index of 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs, NBI; the Misery Index and the Gini coefficient of education, 
which measures inequality in the distribution of the years of schooling in each census 
sector, are highly correlated with the socioeconomic strata – positively in the case of ICV, 
negatively in the case of NBI and the Misery Index.
9 Inequality in the distribution of 
education is higher in the poorest neighborhoods, which also suffer from higher rates of 
violent crime as well as from higher incidence of attacks both by guerrillas and other 
groups (See Map 2).
10 
 
We can now illustrate graphically the spatial correlation between quality-of-life indicators 
and crime variables. Map 2 illustrates the spatial patterns of crime variables at the census 
                                                 
9 See details of the definition of the ICV in DNP (1997). The NBI index measures the share of households in a 
specific census sector that has at least one basic need unsatisfied: adequate housing, basic public utility 
services (water, sewerage, and electricity), economic dependency, primary school dropouts. The Misery Index 
is estimated as the share of households with at least two unsatisfied basic needs. 
10 See Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). These authors find a positive relation 
between income inequality and the homicide and robbery rates. A review of this regularity for Latin American 
and Caribbean Countries can be found in Heinemann and Verner (2006). For the Colombian case, Sánchez 
and Núñez (2000) find that inequality in land distribution is positively related to the homicide rate, although it 
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sector level (quintiles are also used). The circled area, which comprises downtown Bogotá, 
is the area with the highest homicide rate in the city. If we compare Maps 1 with Map 2, it 
becomes apparent that the highest assault, car, and object theft rates correspond to the 
highest stratum neighborhoods. On the contrary, homicides, guerrilla attacks, and attacks 
against life are all much more common in the periphery of the city, which is also much 
poorer. Spatial correlations suggested by the overlapping of the maps are consistent with 
the survey data described by Gaviria and Velez (2001). 
 




































See sources in Table 1. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we present the empirical strategy and the estimation of the effect of crime 
and violence upon house values and rental prices. We estimate a hedonic regression model 
of the logarithm of house values on a battery of both household and amenity variables. The 
specification used takes the following form: 
where  Pij is either the value of the house (cadastral or reported by household) or the 
corresponding rental price (also reported by household), Hi is a vector of household 
characteristics, and Aj is a vector of amenities in census sector j. As customary in the 
                                                 
11 Source: Medina et al. (2007) 
  ij j i ij u A H P     2 1 0 ln      1  12
literature, the model assumes that house values incorporate amenities, including access and 
quality of public goods and services (roads, parks and other green space, transport, security, 
etc.). In equilibrium, amenities would be capitalized into house values and rents.
12 
 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (1), using three different dependent 
variables. The first dependent variable takes the cadastral value of a house, if it is available, 
and takes the value reported by the household if it is not. In this case, we have up to 10,290 
households in our sample. The second variable is restricted to the available cadastral values 
(8,435 observations). Finally, the third variable equals the rental values reported by 
households (12,024 observations). Each set of results contains both OLS and IV results. For 
all regressions, we estimate robust standard errors, correcting for clustering at the census 
sector level. 
 
We focus first on the OLS estimates. Overall, the reported estimates have the expected 
signs. As shown, property values increase for houses located in higher socioeconomic 
strata, for houses with better characteristics, including the number of rooms, the number of 
bathrooms, the availability of piped gas, the presence of parks in the neighborhood, the 
absence of open sewers, and so on. In the first panel, where cadastral values are used if 
available, and reported values otherwise, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
cadastral values are used, and to zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient on the dummy 
implies that cadastral values are on average 10.6% lower than the reported commercial 
values. 
 
Regarding crime variables, the common theft rate (object theft) is negatively related to 
house value. This variable is significant only when rent values are used (Panel 3). 
Homicides rates are negatively related to house values. Attacks by FARC or ELN guerrillas 
and other illegal armed groups are also negatively related to house rental values but the 
coefficients are hardly significant. On the other hand, residential and commercial assaults 
and car thefts are unrelated to house values. Finally, property crimes (attacks against 
wealth) are positively related to house values. 
 
Although we expect all crime variables to be negatively related to house values and rents, 
there are several sources of endogeneity that can bias the results. On the one hand, if some 
types of crime occur more often in better neighborhoods—as it is generally the case with 
property crime—omitted characteristics might be positively correlated with this type of 
crimes. For example, the coefficient of auto theft may be picking up some unobserved 
characteristics that make houses more expensive but also increase the probability of the 
crime in question. On the other hand, some crimes, like homicides or aggravated assaults, 
take place more often in poor neighborhoods because wealthier households are more likely 
to have much better security and the security measures (not always observed) should be 
already capitalized in house values and rents. 
 
                                                 
12 See Rosen (1971, 1974, 2002), Thaler and Rosen (1976), Blomquist et al. (1982), Roback (1982, 1988), and 
Gyourko et. al. (1999), among others. Thaler and Rosen (1976) develop a model that estimates the premium 
workers demand for working in riskier occupations.   13
We estimate equation (1) interacting the crime variables included in Table 2 with the 
socioeconomic strata. Since households differ from one another according to the 
socioeconomic strata in which they are located, we expect to take into account these 
differences and thus attenuate the omitted bias problem.
13 Households differ not only in 
material wellbeing but also in their perceptions about crime and safety. Results are 
presented in Table 3 for the crime-related variables. Once we include the interactions, the 
object theft rate reveals a pattern of negative capitalization as one moves from the lower to 
the higher strata. The higher the stratum, the higher the negative effect of theft upon house 
values. Other variables (assaults, residential and commercial assaults, and attacks by 
FARC, ELN and other groups) show no discernable relationship to house or rent values.  
 
As shown in Table 2, households who report that they feel safe in their neighborhoods pay 
less rent for their houses. This finding is replicated once interactions are included, 
especially for the higher strata. This result should be interpreted cautiously, however, 
because it might be conditioned by differences of perception between the wealthier and the 
poorer households: if the wealthier homes are located in safer neighborhoods and yet their 
owners feel more unsafe than the poorer do, the coefficient would be capturing these 
differences in perception rather than the effect of greater security on capitalized house 
values. 
 
The variable that measures the number of Centers of Immediate Attention (CAIs) —an 
indicator of police presence—, which previously appeared positively related to house rents 
but not to house values, become positively and significantly related to house values when 
interactions are included in the specification. 
 
Even though we already possess a formidable amount of data for control purposes, we are 
well aware of the desirability of obtaining a much more complete data base, one with 
longitudinal information on which we could exploit the dramatic decrease in the homicide 
rate that took place during our period of study, and that could allow us to control for time 
invariant characteristics. In order to account for the endogeneity of our crime variable, we 
now proceed to present an instrumental variable strategy. 
 
Instrumenting the Crime Rate 
 
In this section, we attempt to identify the capitalization effect of crime on house values and 
rents by using an instrumental variable approach. As always, finding a good instrument is 
the key aspect of this approach. In this case, we need a variable that (i) affects the decision 
of the household to live in a neighborhood with a determined crime rate, (ii) does not affect 
the value or rent of the house in a direct fashion. 
                                                 
13 The variables “Cadastral”, “You feel safe in Neighborhood”, “Land use”, “Attacks of FARC, ELN, or other 
groups”, “Number of medical centers”, “Number of private hospitals”, “Number of police headquarters”, 
“Number of local security funds”, “Number of public hospitals”, “Number of religious centers”, “Number of 
social welfare centers”, “Number of cultural centers”, “Number of prisons”, “Number of attacks against life”, 
“Number of attacks against wealth”, “Number of bars”, “Number of brothels”, “Number of casinos/places for 
bets”, “Number of places selling drugs/narcotics”, “Number of people by age range”, and the dummy 
variables of father’s and mother’s education levels and their interactions, are not interacted with the 
socioeconomic strata.   14
 
We use as instruments two variables related to the likelihood that the household head (or 
his spouse) is a teenage mother. Our instrument choice is based on the following rationale: 
(i) children of teenage mothers are more likely to become criminals; (ii) households 
harboring a teenage mother are more likely to live in neighborhoods with high crime and 
homicide rates; and (iii) house vales are not directly affected by teenage mother residence. 
If the previous rationale is true, then we can argue that our instrument is related to crime or 
homicide rates but not to the house value or rent. 
 
The first element of our reasoning, namely that children of teenage mothers are more likely 
to become criminals, is supported by a wealth of evidence. For example, Krug et al. (2002) 
enumerated, among the many factors associated with violence in youths¸ the influence of 
families. These authors enumerate, in turn, parental conflict in early childhood and poor 
attachment between parents and children among the relevant family variables.
14 
Households headed by teenage mothers are likely to be characterized by a family 
environment that includes all said factors. Furthermore, Krug et al. (2002) mention “a 
mother who had her first child at an early age” and “a low level of family cohesion” as 
important risk factors. In the same vein, Donohue and Levitt (2000) provide indirect 
evidence, for the United States, to the effect that children being born out of unwanted 
pregnancies are more likely to become criminals, and in particular, violent offenders. Hunt 
(2003) provides evidence, also for the United States, that children of teenagers are more 
likely to commit assaults later in their lives. 
 
If children of teenage mothers are more likely to become criminals and their households are 
more likely to be poor, then it seems reasonable to expect that these households will sort 
themselves out in neighborhoods where youth crime is high. These high levels of crime 
tend to reinforce themselves through social interactions (another risk factor cited by Krug et 
al. 2002). Again, teenage mothers are more likely to inhabit a neighborhood with high 
crime and homicide rates. Of course, one could argue that teenage motherhood is related to 
socioeconomic level. But the point is that teen pregnancies should be related to violent 
crime rates even after controlling for several socioeconomic status variables.  
 
As proxy variables for teenage mothers in a household or neighborhood, we use the 
difference between the age of the spouse of the household (or alternatively the age of the 
head where the household is female-headed) and her oldest co-residing child. This variable 
is equal to the age of the woman at the time of her first childbearing when all the children 
live in their respective households at the moment of the survey; otherwise, the variable in 
question would be an upper bound of the age at each woman’s first childbearing. We also 
use the share of mothers between 13 and 19 in all populations of that age range in their 
respective census sector population.
15 
 
                                                 
14 Other studies supporting the relationship between teenage motherhood and their children’s likelihood to 
commit crime in the future are Farrington (1998), Morash (1989), and Nagin (1997). 
15 Note that if women were exactly half the population in each census sector, the share of mothers between 13 
and 19 on total number of women in that age range would be twice as large.   15
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the variables we use as instruments. Nearly 13% of 
households have a child that was born when his or her mother was between 13 and 19 years 
old. The median of the share of young mothers is 0.07, and about 14% of young women are 
mothers. The average age difference between the mother and the oldest children at home is 
25, conditional on having at least one child at home; the unconditional mean is 17 (see 
Table 1). 
 
Figure 4. Relative Frequencies of Instrumental Variables 
 
Map 3 shows the quintiles of the homicide rate, and of the proxy variables used as 
instruments: the age difference between the oldest child and his/her mother, and the share 
of teenage mothers in the relevant census sector (quintiles are also used). As expected, the 
age difference variable is negatively correlated to the share of teenage mothers in the 
census sector. There is a high spatial correlation between the age difference and the share of 
teenage mothers in the census sector, and between these two variables and the quintiles of 
the homicide rate.  
 
To assess the existence of spatial correlation we compute local Moran Ii estimates by 
census sector for the three variables shown in Map 3.
16 When constructing the local Moran 
estimates, we compare the homicide rates at each census sector with those of its neighbors 
and with those of the neighbors of its neighbors.
17 
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where  i x  is the variable of interest on which we are interested to test spatial correlation,  ij W  is a matrix of 
weights, and  0 S =
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ij W . Matrix W will be defined depending of the variable of interest, using 
immediate neighbors with their respective neighbors. Positive (negative) values of the Ii index imply the 
existence of similar (different) values of the phenomenon of interest around area i. 
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According to the results (not reported), there are only a few clusters with high homicide 
rates in the city, most of them located in downtown Bogotá (around the circled area shown 
in Map 3). On the other hand, we find that there is a wide area in the north of the city that 
exhibits a very low homicide rate. Finally, we find evidence that allows us to confirm that 
the southern part of the city is characterized by clusters of women having children at a 
much younger age and also by a high incidence of teen pregnancies. The opposite is true 
for the northeastern area of the city. 
 
Map 3. Quintiles of Key Variables at the Census Sector Level 
 
 
We also assess the spatial covariance between our instrumental variables and the homicide 
rate at the census sector level. Our results (not reported) show that our instrumental 
variables are significantly correlated to the homicide rate in the south and northeast of the 
city. Results at the northeast of the city are evident: we find clusters of low homicide rates 
with high (low) age differences (share of teen mothers), meaning that the homicide rate is 
negatively (positively) spatially correlated to our first (second) instrument.  At the south of 
the city, we find some clusters of higher homicide rates with low (high) age differences 
(share of teen mothers), meaning that the homicide rate is spatially correlated to our 
instruments in some census sectors. 
 
The global spatial autocorrelation is 0.044 (p-value: 0.0302) between the share of teen 
mothers and the homicide rate, and -0.0254 (p-value: 0.2101) between the age difference 
and the homicide rate.
18 Finally, it is worth stressing that our choice of instruments is based 
on the assumption that individuals commit a good part of their crimes in the neighborhoods 
where they live (i.e., we assume that in a particular neighborhood the residence of criminals 
is associated with the incidence of crimes).  
 
                                                 
18 Our W() is built using the closest neighbors and their closest neighbors. Results for the share of teen 
mothers are very robust to the W() chosen, although those for the age difference are more sensible. When we 
perform simple averages among the 4 closest neighbors the spatial correlations become -0.0526 (p-value: 
0.0132) and -0.0310 (p-value: 0.1375) for the spatial correlations between the homicide rate and the share of 





















0.73 - 359.22  17
In short, we find that, in the city of Bogotá, our instrumental variables are spatially 
correlated with the homicide rate. Since households are spatially segregated according to 
these variables, we expect them to be correlated with the homicide rate in the census sector. 
On the other hand, we do not expect the instruments to affect house values directly, since 
they constitute neither relevant house characteristics nor amenities people care about when 
deciding where to live. In other words, we assume that the teenage pregnancies in the 
neighborhood are not likely to be capitalized into house values or rents.   18
Table 2. Hedonic Regression for Bogotá 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Stratum 2 0.0461 0.53 0.1449 2.83 0.1419 2.58 0.1722 3.06 0.1721 2.84 0.0197 0.62 0.0342 1.01
Stratum 3 0.0826 0.70 0.3047 4.56 0.2980 4.08 0.3087 4.18 0.3061 3.80 0.1105 3.05 0.1362 3.25
Stratum 4 0.2040 1.24 0.3822 4.18 0.3630 3.16 0.3518 3.43 0.3411 2.65 0.2078 4.32 0.2711 3.81
Stratum 5 0.1735 0.91 0.4643 3.78 0.4469 3.22 0.3599 2.59 0.3481 2.22 0.4267 7.09 0.4803 6.45
Stratum 6 0.0469 0.20 0.6254 4.21 0.6206 4.12 0.5027 3.11 0.5011 3.05 0.7254 9.63 0.7390 9.70
Cadastral House Value (as Opposed to Reported) 0.0148 0.65 -0.1066 -5.00 -0.1078 -4.92 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.00 -0.0297 -2.67 -0.0251 -2.14
Number of rooms -0.0013 -0.16 0.0116 1.67 0.0116 1.66 0.0083 1.13 0.0083 1.12 0.1395 24.80 0.1394 24.73
Number of bathrooms 0.0037 0.24 0.2011 12.83 0.2007 12.57 0.1968 11.66 0.1965 11.46 0.1290 11.63 0.1301 11.50
House with piped gas service -0.0300 -1.00 -0.0046 -0.26 -0.0015 -0.08 -0.0047 -0.24 -0.0026 -0.11 0.0459 3.97 0.0363 2.41
House with telephone -0.0541 -1.76 -0.1483 -4.89 -0.1430 -3.79 -0.1522 -4.79 -0.1494 -3.75 0.2016 11.35 0.1839 7.40
Good quality of electricity 0.0027 0.16 -0.0197 -1.00 -0.0197 -0.99 -0.0220 -0.97 -0.0224 -0.99 -0.0285 -1.96 -0.0277 -1.91
Good quality of garbage collection 0.0081 0.26 0.0371 1.95 0.0366 1.90 0.0320 1.70 0.0319 1.66 -0.0136 -0.96 -0.0111 -0.78
Water available 24 hrs a day 0.0098 0.21 0.1238 2.83 0.1218 2.78 0.1526 2.99 0.1512 2.92 0.0223 0.61 0.0255 0.69
Water available every day of the week 0.0126 0.16 0.0318 0.77 0.0311 0.76 0.0398 0.87 0.0401 0.89 -0.0065 -0.29 -0.0022 -0.10
Good quality of phone line 0.0074 0.49 0.0301 2.13 0.0292 2.03 0.0242 1.56 0.0236 1.50 0.0174 1.40 0.0199 1.55
House with garden -0.0017 -0.07 0.1391 8.23 0.1389 8.23 0.1383 7.67 0.1381 7.67 -0.0055 -0.50 -0.0061 -0.55
House with court yard -0.1146 -3.68 0.1441 3.77 0.1551 3.09 0.1610 3.61 0.1661 2.78 -0.0236 -0.81 -0.0598 -1.55
House with garage  -0.0546 -2.17 0.0742 3.84 0.0793 2.92 0.0681 3.38 0.0705 2.40 0.1023 7.11 0.0851 4.05
House with terrace -0.0221 -0.90 0.1328 7.86 0.1352 7.20 0.1118 6.24 0.1134 5.54 0.0380 3.14 0.0311 2.27
Parks in neighborhood 0.0172 0.47 -0.1084 -3.54 -0.1107 -3.56 -0.1731 -4.75 -0.1763 -4.73 0.0284 1.56 0.0335 1.81
The house has suffered because of a natural disaster -0.0836 -1.47 0.0916 1.92 0.0994 1.87 0.0293 0.57 0.0345 0.59 0.0180 0.56 -0.0080 -0.21
House in area vulnerable to natural disasters 0.1003 1.77 -0.1416 -3.39 -0.1514 -3.17 -0.1054 -2.49 -0.1122 -2.12 -0.0420 -1.41 -0.0107 -0.27
Factories in neighborhood 0.0548 0.54 0.0883 3.34 0.0822 2.76 0.0862 3.14 0.0821 2.62 0.0055 0.33 0.0230 1.05
Garbage collector in neighborhood -0.0067 -0.11 -0.0488 -0.97 -0.0479 -0.94 -0.0695 -1.21 -0.0688 -1.18 0.0238 0.91 0.0217 0.82
Market places in neighborhood -0.0758 -1.04 0.0136 0.36 0.0218 0.49 0.0024 0.06 0.0095 0.19 0.0225 0.93 -0.0010 -0.03
Airport in neighborhood -0.1967 -2.52 -0.0485 -1.13 -0.0282 -0.36 -0.0609 -1.26 -0.0473 -0.54 0.0640 2.45 0.0023 0.04
Terminals of ground transportation in neighborhood 0.0012 0.02 -0.0103 -0.26 -0.0101 -0.26 -0.0708 -1.54 -0.0725 -1.58 0.0541 1.98 0.0546 2.00
House close to open sewers -0.0642 -1.80 -0.0516 -2.01 -0.0455 -1.38 -0.0489 -1.67 -0.0452 -1.17 -0.0034 -0.21 -0.0234 -1.04
House close to high tension lines of electricity transmission 0.0069 0.09 0.0667 1.35 0.0667 1.35 0.0861 1.54 0.0871 1.56 -0.0222 -0.64 -0.0195 -0.56
You feel safe in your neighborhood -0.0675 -4.44 -0.0076 -0.58 -0.0005 -0.02 -0.0119 -0.86 -0.0077 -0.27 -0.0189 -2.00 -0.0401 -1.93
Provision of water is inside the house 0.0367 0.68 0.0085 0.12 0.0033 0.05 0.0086 0.11 0.0049 0.06 0.2043 3.51 0.2159 3.62
The kitchen is a individual room 0.0561 0.92 0.1194 2.73 0.1123 2.24 0.1043 2.19 0.0991 1.82 0.1254 4.49 0.1444 4.36
Shower bath -0.0551 -1.49 0.0318 0.63 0.0356 0.61 0.0107 0.20 0.0131 0.21 0.0921 2.29 0.0749 1.74
House
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Table 2. Hedonic Regression for Bogotá (Continuation) 
 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Walls material is any of: Brick, block, stone, polished wood  0.0599 1.07 0.1004 1.41 0.0925 1.27 0.0908 1.01 0.0841 0.92 0.1432 3.61 0.1626 3.82
Floor material is any of: Marmol, parque, lacquered wood
Floor material is Carpet 0.0268 0.77 -0.2370 -7.68 -0.2408 -7.58 -0.2397 -6.57 -0.2427 -6.48 0.0097 0.49 0.0177 0.85
Floor material is any of: Floor tile, vinyl, tablet, wood  0.0330 0.86 -0.0290 -1.06 -0.0334 -1.12 -0.0134 -0.44 -0.0166 -0.50 -0.0167 -0.98 -0.0063 -0.33
Floor material is any of: Coarse wood, table, plank 0.1531 2.47 0.0487 1.21 0.0307 0.45 0.0638 1.47 0.0519 0.69 -0.0835 -3.07 -0.0355 -0.72
Floor material is any of: Cement, gravilla, earth, sand -0.0218 -0.60 -0.2331 -5.99 -0.2318 -5.84 -0.2084 -4.84 -0.2078 -4.72 -0.1473 -5.65 -0.1538 -5.68
House with Toilet connected to the public sewerage 0.0886 0.69 -0.1361 -1.09 -0.1489 -1.16 -0.1925 -1.24 -0.2009 -1.26 0.0742 0.74 0.1015 0.99
House with potable water service 0.1759 1.22 0.2373 2.13 0.2212 1.72 0.3368 2.41 0.3253 2.06 -0.0368 -0.55 0.0188 0.22
Number of infantile shelters
 0.0073 0.12 -0.0594 -1.75 -0.0600 -1.76 -0.0994 -1.96 -0.0992 -1.97 0.0019 0.09 0.0042 0.21
Number of asylums
 -0.0107 -0.18 0.0009 0.03 0.0019 0.07 0.0116 0.37 0.0123 0.39 0.0209 1.25 0.0175 1.05
Number of convents
 -0.0459 -1.35 -0.0035 -0.25 0.0014 0.07 0.0072 0.40 0.0108 0.43 -0.0057 -0.78 -0.0201 -1.41
Objects theft rate  -0.0991 -1.21 -0.0281 -1.37 -0.0182 -0.47 -0.0141 -0.66 -0.0081 -0.18 -0.0252 -3.10 -0.0562 -1.96
Assaults rate  0.0913 3.95 -0.0053 -0.71 -0.0147 -0.46 -0.0035 -0.46 -0.0095 -0.27 0.0035 1.17 0.0322 1.29
Residential and commercial assault rate  0.0693 1.51 0.0129 1.00 0.0062 0.24 0.0127 0.90 0.0089 0.30 0.0020 0.45 0.0236 1.20
Cars theft rate  -0.0721 -2.75 -0.0017 -0.23 0.0056 0.21 -0.0064 -0.70 -0.0019 -0.06 0.0030 0.88 -0.0197 -0.99
Homicide rate (deaths per 10'000,000 people)  -0.0470 -1.70 0.0555 0.17 -0.0411 -1.45 0.0224 0.06 -0.0115 -1.43 -0.3253 -1.18
Land use  -0.5262 -0.44 -0.0725 -0.15 -0.0094 -0.02 -0.1376 -0.28 -0.0813 -0.16 -0.2480 -0.61 -0.4099 -0.95
Attacks by FARC, ELN or other illegal groups
**  -0.0237 -0.31 -0.0461 -1.26 -0.0441 -1.15 -0.0366 -0.91 -0.0362 -0.87 -0.0324 -1.60 -0.0400 -1.91
Share of women heads of households  -0.2071 -0.21 -2.2102 -5.45 -2.1998 -5.33 -2.4374 -5.40 -2.4475 -5.33 -0.1445 -0.60 -0.2130 -0.84
Labor force Unemployment rate  0.0296 0.57 -0.1002 -4.75 -0.1037 -4.40 -0.1260 -5.84 -0.1288 -5.33 -0.0161 -1.61 -0.0069 -0.50
Illiteracy rate  -5.7389 -1.80 0.0479 0.03 0.6566 0.27 -0.3278 -0.20 0.1107 0.04 1.2972 1.69 -0.5061 -0.29
Average education  -0.3234 -2.73 -0.0380 -0.96 -0.0050 -0.04 -0.0497 -1.10 -0.0282 -0.21 0.0983 4.95 -0.0035 -0.04
Index of Quality of Life
***  0.0565 2.11 0.0442 4.75 0.0384 1.80 0.0440 4.14 0.0399 1.67 0.0076 1.42 0.0253 1.52
Gini of education  11.0243 1.44 0.2304 0.09 -0.9956 -0.22 -1.8934 -0.63 -2.8396 -0.55 2.8591 1.70 6.3087 1.73
Number of CAIS
****  0.0065 0.14 0.0014 0.10 0.0004 0.03 0.0037 0.27 0.0028 0.20 0.0127 2.10 0.0147 2.30
Number of medical centers  -0.0655 -2.95 -0.0109 -1.10 -0.0044 -0.18 -0.0131 -1.26 -0.0091 -0.34 -0.0037 -0.87 -0.0243 -1.35
Number of private hospitals  0.0654 1.89 0.0048 0.30 -0.0017 -0.06 0.0114 0.58 0.0076 0.24 0.0092 1.53 0.0297 1.57
Number of police headquarters  0.0688 0.58 0.0543 1.04 0.0481 0.91 0.0818 1.50 0.0778 1.40 0.0313 2.48 0.0529 2.36
Number of local security funds  -0.0064 -1.80 0.0018 1.41 0.0025 1.06 0.0018 1.26 0.0022 0.81 0.0010 1.61 -0.0010 -0.53
Number of public hospitals  0.0405 0.71 0.0008 0.06 -0.0036 -0.19 -0.0056 -0.41 -0.0093 -0.47 0.0016 0.20 0.0142 1.02
Number of religious centers  0.0288 0.76 0.0171 1.56 0.0145 0.93 0.0195 1.65 0.0178 1.05 0.0021 0.45 0.0112 1.22
Number of social welfare centers  0.0266 1.67 0.0084 1.41 0.0054 0.50 0.0110 1.55 0.0091 0.73 -0.0010 -0.40 0.0074 0.97
Number of cultural centers  0.0124 1.47 0.0023 0.98 0.0009 0.20 0.0010 0.42 0.0002 0.04 0.0006 0.56 0.0045 1.26
Number of prisons  0.2469 0.91 0.0203 0.51 -0.0079 -0.09 -0.0009 -0.02 -0.0201 -0.19 0.0168 0.73 0.0944 1.31
Number of attempts on a person’s life  0.0425 0.80 -0.0460 -2.60 -0.0508 -2.24 -0.0606 -3.23 -0.0637 -2.61 -0.0067 -0.72 0.0068 0.45
Number of attacks against wealth  0.0716 1.26 0.0344 2.14 0.0262 0.88 0.0314 1.82 0.0251 0.75 0.0092 1.04 0.0316 1.49
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Table 2. Hedonic Regression for Bogotá (Continuation) 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Number of brothels
 -0.1068 -1.98 0.0024 0.13 0.0133 0.35 0.0148 0.77 0.0215 0.50 -0.0179 -1.64 -0.0515 -1.70
Number of casinos/places for bets
 0.0310 0.53 -0.0034 -0.18 -0.0080 -0.37 -0.0192 -1.02 -0.0232 -1.05 -0.0033 -0.30 0.0066 0.50
Number of places selling drugs/narcotics
 -0.0593 -1.15 -0.0198 -1.16 -0.0135 -0.53 -0.0207 -1.16 -0.0162 -0.58 -0.0002 -0.02 -0.0187 -1.02
Number of people 0-4 years old
 -0.0002 -0.52 0.0003 1.94 0.0004 1.91 0.0004 2.05 0.0004 1.98 0.0001 0.73 0.0000 0.02
Number of people 5-9 years old
 0.0002 0.39 -0.0003 -1.40 -0.0004 -1.44 -0.0004 -1.53 -0.0004 -1.53 0.0000 0.06 0.0001 0.44
Number of people 10-14 years old
 -0.0012 -2.86 -0.0004 -1.73 -0.0002 -0.59 -0.0004 -1.85 -0.0003 -0.69 0.0000 -0.12 -0.0004 -1.13
Number of people 15-19 years old
 0.0004 0.67 0.0000 -0.15 -0.0001 -0.28 0.0000 -0.15 -0.0001 -0.25 -0.0004 -2.68 -0.0003 -1.54
Number of people 20-24 years old
 0.0000 0.07 -0.0001 -0.46 -0.0001 -0.45 -0.0001 -0.22 -0.0001 -0.21 0.0001 0.58 0.0001 0.67
Number of people 25-29 years old
 -0.0005 -1.21 -0.0001 -0.26 0.0000 -0.06 -0.0002 -0.64 -0.0001 -0.41 0.0000 0.43 -0.0001 -0.65
Number of people 30-34 years old
 0.0004 1.00 0.0002 0.91 0.0002 0.61 0.0003 1.01 0.0002 0.72 -0.0001 -0.58 0.0001 0.44
Number of people 35-39 years old
 0.0000 0.05 -0.0004 -1.62 -0.0004 -1.60 -0.0004 -1.50 -0.0004 -1.50 -0.0001 -1.03 -0.0001 -0.99
Number of people 40-44 years old
 0.0010 1.23 0.0004 1.18 0.0003 0.58 0.0004 1.19 0.0003 0.65 0.0003 1.76 0.0006 1.79
Number of people 45-49 years old
 -0.0004 -0.44 0.0002 0.51 0.0002 0.59 0.0001 0.34 0.0002 0.42 0.0002 1.42 0.0001 0.59
Number of people 50-54 years old
 0.0005 0.52 -0.0001 -0.19 -0.0001 -0.29 0.0000 -0.10 -0.0001 -0.17 0.0000 -0.02 0.0002 0.64
Number of people 55-59 years old
 0.0005 0.54 -0.0003 -0.88 -0.0004 -0.94 -0.0002 -0.51 -0.0002 -0.52 -0.0001 -0.44 0.0001 0.20
Number of people 60 +   years old
 -0.0004 -1.79 0.0005 5.08 0.0005 3.07 0.0005 4.35 0.0005 2.71 0.0001 2.21 0.0000 -0.12
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI): Dependency
 -0.0008 -0.33 0.0012 0.94 0.0013 0.96 0.0013 0.96 0.0013 0.95 0.0010 1.79 0.0008 1.20
NBI: Accumulation
 0.0007 2.27 0.0006 4.44 0.0006 2.11 0.0007 3.95 0.0006 1.98 0.0001 0.74 0.0003 1.35
NBI: Dropouts
 0.0176 2.32 -0.0022 -0.77 -0.0039 -0.63 -0.0015 -0.50 -0.0025 -0.36 -0.0016 -1.07 0.0040 0.80
NBI: Public utility services
 0.0006 1.79 -0.0002 -0.81 -0.0002 -0.77 0.0000 -0.14 -0.0001 -0.21 -0.0002 -1.68 0.0000 0.13
NBI: Housing in
 -0.0001 -0.14 0.0003 1.25 0.0003 1.26 0.0005 1.57 0.0005 1.57 -0.0001 -0.53 -0.0001 -0.70
NBI: NBI in Municipality where were born
 0.0010 1.60 0.0008 1.85 0.0007 1.43 0.0011 2.24 0.0011 1.81 -0.0006 -2.07 -0.0003 -0.81
NBI: NBI in Municipality where were born
 0.0353 1.74 0.0468 2.21 0.0431 1.87 0.0531 2.23 0.0507 1.97 0.0155 0.90 0.0260 1.31
Born in urban area 0.0219 1.22 -0.0078 -0.51 -0.0104 -0.61 -0.0067 -0.42 -0.0083 -0.45 -0.0056 -0.48 0.0016 0.12
Household with children 0.0673 2.60
Age of mother minus age of oldest children -0.0020 -2.52
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All regressions include dummy variable of father's and mother's education levels and their interactions. t statistics computed based on robust standard errors corrected by clustering at the census sector level. 1/ Cadastral values if
available, otherwise, the value reported by households surveyd.  2/ Only includes households for which cadastral values are available.
Sources: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003, Real State Appraisal of Bogotá, National Police-DIJIN 2000, Paz Pública (2000). Colombian 1993 Population Census.
* Dummy variable equal to one if house, 0 otherwise (apartment, etc.).
** Dummy variable equal to one if there have been attacks in census sector by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, Ejército de Liberación
Nacional, ELN, or other groups. 
*** A-Theoretical estimation of QoL (See methodology in DNP, 1997). 
**** Centros de Atención Inmediata, CAIS: Centers of Immediate -Police- Attention. 
 At the census sector level.
8,435 12,024 12,024
0.557 0.577 0.578 0.585 0.586 0.683
12,120 10,290 10,290 8,435
2SLS
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Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the instrumental variables estimation. Table 2 presents 
the estimation results of a specification that does not incorporate interactions, whereas 
Table 3 presents the results of a specification that incorporates interactions between the 
crime variables and the strata. We will focus on Table 3. The first column presents the first 
stage results. These results indicate that our instrument (the age difference) is statistically 
significant, and has the expected negative sign. When we use the combination of cadastral 
and rental values as the dependent variable, we find that the coefficient of the interactions 
between the homicide rate and strata 3 and 6 are positive in the OLS regression, whereas 
the coefficients of the interactions between the homicide rate and strata 5 and 6 are 
significant and negative in the IV regression. When we use only cadastral data as the 
dependent variable, we find that the coefficient of the interaction between the homicide rate 
and stratum 6 becomes significant, and negative. When rental values are used, the results 
are more erratic, and neither of the interactions is significant in the IV regression.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the IV estimations. The upper panel of Table 4 shows 
that the elasticity of house values to the homicide rate for houses located  in socioeconomic 
stratum 6 is about -0.90%. Put differently, if the homicide rate in stratum 6 were to increase 
by one standard deviation --an increase of 7.3 times the mean value--, house values would 
fall between 5.8% and 7.0%. In the case of stratum 5, the elasticity is between -0.23% and -
0.26%, which implies a decrease of between 2.3% and 2.5% in the value of the house if 
homicides increase by one standard deviation.  
 
The other crime variables (common theft, assaults, residential and commercial assaults 
rates, attacks by guerilla groups, and attacks against wealth) are not significant in the IV 
estimation. The car theft variable is negative and significant only for its interaction with 
stratum 5. Finally, “attempts on a person’s life” is negative and statistically significant in 
almost all specifications.  
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Table 3. Hedonic Regression for Bogotá. 
Instrument: age difference between mother and oldest child 
 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Cadastral value 0.0146 0.69 -0.1135 -5.54 -0.1147 -5.51 -0.0232 -2.15 -0.0221 -1.95
You feel safe in your neighborhood -0.0250 -0.68 0.0541 1.21 0.0565 1.23 0.0433 0.87 0.0423 0.83 -0.0095 -0.35 -0.0130 -0.47
" * Stratum 2 -0.0277 -0.73 -0.0411 -0.80 -0.0361 -0.70 -0.0167 -0.30 -0.0177 -0.31 -0.0181 -0.54 -0.0215 -0.62
" * Stratum 3 -0.0398 -0.97 -0.0629 -1.32 -0.0686 -1.39 -0.0632 -1.20 -0.0780 -1.41 -0.0160 -0.53 -0.0186 -0.58
" * Stratum 4 -0.0022 -0.04 -0.0732 -1.48 -0.0749 -1.50 -0.0637 -1.15 -0.0714 -1.27 0.0256 0.67 0.0281 0.74
" * Stratum 5 0.0538 1.23 -0.1112 -1.57 -0.1088 -1.47 -0.1210 -1.77 -0.1122 -1.53 0.0382 0.82 0.0439 0.90
" * Stratum 6 0.0430 0.95 -0.0809 -0.91 -0.0618 -0.71 -0.0738 -1.12 -0.0510 -0.75 -0.0867 -1.50 -0.0755 -1.27
Objects theft rate  -0.5349 -3.57 0.0891 1.02 0.0910 0.39 0.0669 0.69 -0.0311 -0.12 -0.0695 -1.77 -0.1229 -0.72
" * Stratum 2 0.5236 1.73 -0.0541 -0.34 -0.0744 -0.29 -0.0198 -0.12 0.0507 0.18 0.0202 0.31 0.0733 0.43
" * Stratum 3 0.4175 1.75 -0.0645 -0.72 -0.0738 -0.38 -0.0440 -0.44 0.0225 0.10 0.0545 1.36 0.0950 0.70
" * Stratum 4 0.5246 3.38 -0.1225 -1.36 -0.1245 -0.54 -0.1114 -1.13 -0.0083 -0.03 0.0677 1.56 0.1174 0.69
" * Stratum 5 0.5335 3.23 -0.1667 -1.56 -0.1688 -0.72 -0.1063 -0.93 -0.0058 -0.02 0.0608 1.15 0.1131 0.65
" * Stratum 6 0.4705 4.06 -0.1566 -1.72 -0.0905 -0.43 -0.0364 -0.32 0.0016 0.01 0.0074 0.16 0.0927 0.60
Assaults rate  0.0332 1.65 -0.0174 -0.93 -0.0211 -0.93 -0.0120 -0.59 -0.0119 -0.47 0.0061 0.75 0.0102 0.74
" * Stratum 2 0.0141 0.23 0.0106 0.39 0.0025 0.09 -0.0006 -0.02 -0.0055 -0.20 0.0029 0.29 0.0066 0.53
" * Stratum 3 0.1020 2.70 -0.0135 -0.67 0.0006 0.01 -0.0196 -0.86 0.0173 0.34 -0.0111 -1.22 -0.0019 -0.06
" * Stratum 4 -0.0150 -0.45 0.0021 0.10 0.0069 0.33 -0.0188 -0.82 -0.0146 -0.63 -0.0119 -0.95 -0.0161 -1.18
" * Stratum 5 -0.0152 -0.45 0.0035 0.13 0.0079 0.33 0.0210 0.80 0.0280 1.09 0.0045 0.26 0.0000 0.00
" * Stratum 6 -0.0367 -1.28 0.0023 0.10 0.0109 0.41 0.0131 0.54 -0.0013 -0.04 -0.0033 -0.22 -0.0050 -0.23
Residential and commercial assault rate  0.2908 5.96 0.0358 0.58 -0.0194 -0.13 0.0262 0.41 0.0210 0.13 -0.0093 -0.53 0.0253 0.27
" * Stratum 2 0.0164 0.16 0.0414 0.60 0.0134 0.13 0.0478 0.68 0.0217 0.20 0.0239 0.94 0.0372 0.91
" * Stratum 3 -0.2549 -3.18 -0.0275 -0.44 0.0297 0.22 -0.0094 -0.15 0.0060 0.04 0.0202 1.06 -0.0111 -0.13
" * Stratum 4 -0.2107 -4.12 0.0156 0.26 0.0706 0.59 0.0420 0.67 0.0700 0.54 0.0254 1.29 -0.0049 -0.07
" * Stratum 5 -0.2774 -5.14 0.0192 0.28 0.0775 0.54 0.0011 0.02 0.0109 0.07 -0.0052 -0.21 -0.0385 -0.42
" * Stratum 6 -0.2890 -4.29 -0.0487 -0.69 -0.1159 -0.76 -0.0803 -0.90 -0.0716 -0.42 0.0287 0.82 -0.0647 -0.63
Cars theft rate  -0.0655 -3.14 -0.0006 -0.04 0.0202 0.54 0.0109 0.47 0.0225 0.56 0.0125 1.32 0.0036 0.15
" * Stratum 2 -0.1964 -2.94 -0.0398 -1.09 0.0060 0.07 -0.0453 -1.13 -0.0331 -0.35 -0.0184 -0.98 -0.0497 -0.77
" * Stratum 3 -0.0098 -0.27 0.0083 0.43 -0.0189 -0.68 -0.0083 -0.34 -0.0413 -1.44 -0.0084 -0.83 -0.0067 -0.46
" * Stratum 4 0.0229 0.72 -0.0003 -0.01 -0.0218 -0.76 -0.0042 -0.16 -0.0275 -0.91 -0.0155 -1.20 -0.0088 -0.52
" * Stratum 5 0.0048 0.08 -0.0094 -0.30 -0.0348 -1.05 -0.0437 -1.26 -0.0735 -2.08 -0.0028 -0.14 0.0017 0.08
" * Stratum 6 0.1320 2.77 0.0602 2.12 0.1769 2.31 0.0359 0.97 0.1053 1.29 -0.0334 -1.43 0.0422 0.77
Homicide rate  -0.1541 -2.57 0.0261 0.06 -0.1335 -1.93 -0.1050 -0.21 0.0061 0.20 -0.1157 -0.36
" * Stratum 2 0.1281 1.71 0.1469 0.64 0.1141 1.34 0.1106 0.44 0.0160 0.47 -0.0054 -0.06
" * Stratum 3 0.1249 1.99 -0.1129 -0.65 0.1084 1.53 -0.1752 -0.92 -0.0198 -0.63 0.0031 0.04
" * Stratum 4 0.0452 0.47 -0.1160 -0.58 0.0422 0.40 -0.2800 -1.33 -0.0395 -0.76 0.0517 0.51
" * Stratum 5 -0.1817 -0.85 -0.4501 -2.14 -0.1569 -0.76 -0.3674 -1.60 -0.0673 -0.37 -0.0956 -0.55
" * Stratum 6 0.7461 2.64 -1.1070 -2.63 0.0634 0.19 -0.7913 -1.91 0.9072 4.25 0.2016 0.78
Attacks by FARC, ELN or other illegal groups
**  -0.0443 -0.60 -0.0064 -0.19 -0.0027 -0.07 0.0175 0.46 0.0098 0.23 -0.0171 -0.85 -0.0213 -0.89
Number of CAIS
**** 0.0528 0.33 -0.1519 -1.88 -0.1384 -1.57 -0.1614 -1.42 -0.0931 -0.73 0.0093 0.18 0.0151 0.28
" * Stratum 2 0.0052 0.03 0.1831 2.06 0.1647 1.74 0.1965 1.61 0.1349 1.00 0.0204 0.38 0.0222 0.40
" * Stratum 3 -0.0588 -0.34 0.1732 2.12 0.1607 1.80 0.1784 1.56 0.1093 0.85 0.0024 0.04 -0.0042 -0.07
" * Stratum 4 -0.1729 -0.91 0.1726 1.94 0.1558 1.32 0.1852 1.53 0.0799 0.54 -0.0128 -0.22 -0.0235 -0.31
" * Stratum 5 -0.0201 -0.11 0.1765 1.83 0.1676 1.77 0.1629 1.29 0.0923 0.68 -0.0201 -0.33 -0.0136 -0.22
" * Stratum 6 -0.0615 -0.35 0.3128 3.46 0.3226 3.29 0.2461 1.79 0.1667 1.15 0.0995 1.61 0.1040 1.68
Number of police headquarters  0.0661 0.61 0.0731 1.54 0.0793 1.51 0.0896 1.57 0.1153 1.85 0.0380 2.99 0.0363 1.43
Number of local security funds  -0.0037 -1.05 0.0019 1.42 0.0016 0.85 0.0023 1.50 0.0013 0.60 0.0007 1.06 0.0003 0.19
Number of prisons  0.2143 0.80 0.0230 0.82 0.0165 0.18 0.0246 0.73 0.0734 0.73 0.0060 0.28 0.0221 0.31
Number of attempts on a person’s life  0.0041 0.08 -0.0332 -1.95 -0.0349 -2.02 -0.0569 -2.99 -0.0576 -2.98 -0.0076 -0.81 -0.0068 -0.73
Number of attacks against wealth  0.0954 1.63 0.0195 1.20 0.0177 0.43 0.0294 1.62 0.0469 1.02 0.0031 0.37 0.0125 0.41
Number of bars  -0.0093 -0.15 0.0070 0.45 0.0070 0.44 0.0043 0.26 0.0037 0.22 0.0143 1.77 0.0136 1.57
Number of brothels  -0.0817 -1.57 0.0060 0.34 0.0069 0.20 0.0185 0.99 0.0013 0.03 -0.0117 -1.13 -0.0205 -0.78
Number of casinos/places for bets  0.0431 0.70 0.0017 0.09 -0.0042 -0.17 -0.0149 -0.73 -0.0121 -0.45 -0.0061 -0.58 -0.0010 -0.07
Number of places selling drugs/narcotics  -0.0512 -1.09 -0.0330 -2.00 -0.0366 -1.35 -0.0354 -2.03 -0.0487 -1.66 0.0002 0.02 -0.0046 -0.25
Age of mother minus age of oldest children -0.0017 -2.32
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All regressions include dummy variable of father and mother's education levels and their 
interactions. t statistics computed based on robust standard errors corrected by clustering at 
the census sector level. 1/ Cadastral values if available, otherwise, the value reported by 
households surveyed.  2/ Only includes households for which cadastral values are available. 
Sources: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003, Real State Appraisal of Bogotá, National 
Police-DIJIN 2000, Paz Pública (2000). Colombian 1993 Population Census. 
* Dummy variable equal to one if house, zero otherwise (apartment, etc.). 
** Attacks by 
guerrilla groups Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN, or other groups. 
*** A-Theoretical estimation of QoL (See 
methodology in DNP, 1997). 
****  Centros de Atención Inmediata,  CAIS: Centers of 
Immediate -Police- Attention.  At the census sector level.   23
Finally, Table 5 presents the results of instrumenting the homicide rate with the share of 
teenage mothers in the census sector. The first column presents the first stage results, and 
the other columns the second stage results. The first column shows that the instrument 
variable is statistically significant, and has the expected positive sign. 
 
Turning now to the effects of the homicide rate on property values, we find that in the IV 
regression the coefficients of the interactions between the homicide rate and strata 5 and 6 
are significant, and negative, when we use either house value. When we use only cadastral 
values, the coefficients of the interactions with strata 3 to 6 are all significant.  
 
The IV results imply that the elasticity of the house value to homicide rate in 
socioeconomic stratum 6 is between -0.8% and -0.95%. That is, if the homicide rate in 
stratum 6 were to increase by one standard deviation, house values would fall between 
5.8% and 6.9%. In the case of strata 3, 4, and 5, the elasticites are -6.9%, -0.72%, and -
0.26% respectively, which imply a fall of 13.5%, 4.4% and 2.5% in house values after an 
increase of one standard deviation in homicide rates. Moving a household formerly living 
in a particular stratum, from an average neighborhood in that stratum, to one with a 
homicide rate one standard deviation higher in the same stratum, would allow it to move to 
a house whose value would be lower in a magnitude equivalent to between 2.5 and 3.4 
times its monthly per capita income, or saving for once between USD 3,700 and USD 
4,900. The same figure for a stratum 5 household would be between 1.5 and 1.85 its 
monthly per capita income, or between USD 1,015 and USD 1,266. Results for the other 
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Table 4. Summary Results of the Effects of the Homicide Rate on House Values 
Instrument: Age Difference 
Homicide Rate 0.02608 0.0104 1.31 0.014 1.15 112
Stratum 5 -0.45010 -0.0023 9.81 -0.023 -1.49 -1,015
Stratum 6 -1.10701 -0.0096 7.29 -0.070 -3.35 -4,884
Homicide Rate -0.10497 -0.0420 1.31 -0.055 -4.67 -456
Stratum 5 -0.36745 -0.0026 9.81 -0.025 -1.59 -1,086







Results with house values coming only from cadastral data
Results with house values coming from cadastral or self reported data
Elasticity Coefficient
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D House Value/ 
House Value
D Homicide Rate 
(1 st dev)/ 
Homicide Rate
 
Instrument: Share of Teenage Mothers 
Homicide Rate 0.11250 0.0450 1.31 0.059 4.96 484
Stratum 3 -0.25556 -0.0354 1.95 -0.069 -7.70 -1,280
Stratum 4 -0.17383 -0.0011 6.19 -0.007 -0.48 -199
Stratum 5 -0.64121 -0.0029 9.81 -0.028 -1.85 -1,266
Stratum 6 -1.17334 -0.0095 7.29 -0.069 -3.29 -4,793
Homicide Rate -0.10497 -0.0420 1.31 -0.055 -4.63 -452
Stratum 3 -0.17516 -0.0693 1.95 -0.135 -15.08 -2,507
Stratum 4 -0.28005 -0.0072 6.19 -0.044 -3.02 -1,248
Stratum 5 -0.36745 -0.0026 9.81 -0.025 -1.66 -1,131
Stratum 6 -0.79130 -0.0080 7.29 -0.058 -2.78 -4,049
DHouse Value/ 
Monthly Hhold Per 
Capita Income
DHouse Value/ 








Results with house values coming only from cadastral data
Results with house values coming from cadastral or self reported data
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* The amount is a once and for all change in the house value due to moving from an average 
neighborhood to one with a homicide rate one standard deviation higher. The dollar amount 
estimated was based on the exchange rate in December 2003 ($2,778.2/USD).   25
Table 5. Hedonic Regression for Bogotá. 
Instrument: Share of teenage mothers in census sector 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Cadastral value 0.0152 0.73 -0.114 -5.54 -0.112 -5.40 -0.0232 -2.15 -0.0234 -2.17
You feel safe in your neighborhood -0.022 -0.55 0.054 1.21 0.057 1.29 0.043 0.87 0.042 0.85 -0.009 -0.35 -0.007 -0.26
" * Stratum 2 -0.020 -0.49 -0.041 -0.80 -0.040 -0.79 -0.017 -0.30 -0.011 -0.19 -0.018 -0.54 -0.020 -0.59
" * Stratum 3 -0.038 -0.85 -0.063 -1.32 -0.072 -1.52 -0.063 -1.20 -0.068 -1.29 -0.016 -0.53 -0.017 -0.57
" * Stratum 4 -0.0003 -0.01 -0.073 -1.48 -0.074 -1.51 -0.064 -1.15 -0.065 -1.17 0.026 0.67 0.025 0.67
" * Stratum 5 0.048 1.01 -0.111 -1.57 -0.109 -1.57 -0.121 -1.77 -0.118 -1.71 0.038 0.82 0.035 0.75
" * Stratum 6 0.042 0.86 -0.081 -0.91 -0.062 -0.72 -0.074 -1.12 -0.048 -0.74 -0.087 -1.50 -0.084 -1.45
Objects theft rate  -0.542 -3.53 0.089 1.02 0.109 0.88 0.067 0.69 0.103 0.78 -0.069 -1.77 -0.059 -0.98
" * Stratum 2 0.661 2.15 -0.054 -0.34 -0.084 -0.46 -0.020 -0.12 -0.074 -0.39 0.020 0.31 0.009 0.11
" * Stratum 3 0.432 1.83 -0.065 -0.72 -0.096 -0.83 -0.044 -0.44 -0.093 -0.74 0.054 1.36 0.044 0.80
" * Stratum 4 0.539 3.41 -0.123 -1.36 -0.145 -1.16 -0.111 -1.13 -0.142 -1.06 0.068 1.56 0.054 0.88
" * Stratum 5 0.552 3.30 -0.167 -1.56 -0.188 -1.41 -0.106 -0.93 -0.142 -1.01 0.061 1.15 0.048 0.71
" * Stratum 6 0.503 4.09 -0.157 -1.72 -0.106 -0.87 -0.036 -0.32 -0.135 -0.95 0.007 0.16 0.035 0.53
Assaults rate  0.031 1.37 -0.017 -0.93 -0.027 -1.61 -0.012 -0.59 -0.025 -1.34 0.006 0.75 0.004 0.39
" * Stratum 2 0.027 0.49 0.011 0.39 0.014 0.56 -0.001 -0.02 0.002 0.08 0.003 0.29 0.004 0.34
" * Stratum 3 0.094 2.53 -0.014 -0.67 0.014 0.56 -0.020 -0.86 0.010 0.38 -0.011 -1.22 -0.010 -0.78
" * Stratum 4 -0.014 -0.42 0.002 0.10 0.012 0.61 -0.019 -0.82 -0.007 -0.33 -0.012 -0.95 -0.012 -0.92
" * Stratum 5 -0.018 -0.53 0.003 0.13 0.009 0.42 0.021 0.80 0.030 1.30 0.005 0.26 0.003 0.16
" * Stratum 6 -0.031 -1.06 0.002 0.10 0.018 0.80 0.013 0.54 0.010 0.43 -0.003 -0.22 0.002 0.09
Residential and commercial assault rate  0.298 5.20 0.036 0.58 -0.049 -0.53 0.026 0.41 -0.084 -0.90 -0.009 -0.53 -0.016 -0.49
" * Stratum 2 -0.0397 -0.40 0.041 0.60 0.081 0.80 0.048 0.68 0.097 0.94 0.024 0.94 0.017 0.48
" * Stratum 3 -0.258 -3.04 -0.027 -0.44 0.061 0.68 -0.009 -0.15 0.105 1.17 0.020 1.06 0.026 0.83
" * Stratum 4 -0.213 -3.71 0.016 0.26 0.099 1.19 0.042 0.67 0.160 1.88 0.025 1.29 0.027 0.88
" * Stratum 5 -0.300 -4.91 0.019 0.28 0.108 1.15 0.001 0.02 0.116 1.23 -0.005 -0.21 0.002 0.07
" * Stratum 6 -0.319 -4.34 -0.049 -0.69 -0.087 -0.86 -0.080 -0.90 0.040 0.36 0.029 0.82 -0.022 -0.42
Cars theft rate  -0.072 -3.03 -0.001 -0.04 0.033 1.32 0.011 0.47 0.054 2.12 0.013 1.32 0.013 1.05
" * Stratum 2 -0.207 -3.12 -0.040 -1.09 -0.038 -0.61 -0.045 -1.13 -0.037 -0.59 -0.018 -0.98 -0.009 -0.29
" * Stratum 3 0.003 0.08 0.008 0.43 -0.036 -1.42 -0.008 -0.34 -0.061 -2.36 -0.008 -0.83 -0.008 -0.67
" * Stratum 4 0.024 0.75 0.000 -0.01 -0.034 -1.36 -0.004 -0.16 -0.049 -1.93 -0.016 -1.20 -0.013 -0.92
" * Stratum 5 0.017 0.28 -0.009 -0.30 -0.044 -1.44 -0.044 -1.26 -0.089 -2.76 -0.003 -0.14 0.000 0.02
" * Stratum 6 0.149 3.18 0.060 2.12 0.162 2.77 0.036 0.97 0.073 1.32 -0.033 -1.43 0.024 0.66
Homicide rate  -0.154 -2.57 0.112 0.60 -0.134 -1.93 0.238 1.16 0.006 0.20 0.041 0.43
" * Stratum 2 0.128 1.71 -0.044 -0.22 0.114 1.34 -0.119 -0.53 0.016 0.47 0.019 0.23
" * Stratum 3 0.125 1.99 -0.256 -1.72 0.108 1.53 -0.373 -2.23 -0.020 -0.63 -0.042 -0.60
" * Stratum 4 0.045 0.47 -0.174 -0.98 0.042 0.40 -0.415 -2.18 -0.039 -0.76 0.016 0.17
" * Stratum 5 -0.182 -0.85 -0.641 -3.22 -0.157 -0.76 -0.648 -2.84 -0.067 -0.37 -0.178 -1.00
" * Stratum 6 0.746 2.64 -1.173 -2.73 0.063 0.19 -1.174 -2.67 0.907 4.25 0.178 0.71
Attacks by FARC, ELN or other illegal groups
**  -0.016 -0.21 -0.0064 -0.19 -0.0042 -0.12 0.0175 0.46 0.0184 0.47 -0.0171 -0.85 -0.0137 -0.68
Number of CAIS
**** 0.019 0.11 -0.1519 -1.88 -0.1408 -1.55 -0.1614 -1.42 -0.0760 -0.53 0.0093 0.18 -0.0121 -0.23
" * Stratum 2 0.027 0.16 0.1831 2.06 0.1715 1.74 0.1965 1.61 0.1098 0.74 0.0204 0.38 0.0409 0.77
" * Stratum 3 -0.039 -0.21 0.1732 2.12 0.1628 1.78 0.1784 1.56 0.0927 0.64 0.0024 0.04 0.0241 0.46
" * Stratum 4 -0.141 -0.70 0.1726 1.94 0.1621 1.61 0.1852 1.53 0.0882 0.59 -0.0128 -0.22 0.0184 0.32
" * Stratum 5 0.039 0.20 0.1765 1.83 0.1859 1.88 0.1629 1.29 0.0907 0.61 -0.0201 -0.33 0.0157 0.25
" * Stratum 6 0.009 0.05 0.3128 3.46 0.3217 3.21 0.2461 1.79 0.1377 0.87 0.0995 1.61 0.1316 2.24
Number of police headquarters  0.047 0.48 0.0731 1.54 0.0768 1.70 0.0896 1.57 0.1017 1.88 0.0380 2.99 0.0275 1.84
Number of local security funds  -0.004 -1.01 0.0019 1.42 0.0014 0.97 0.0023 1.50 0.0018 1.16 0.0007 1.06 0.0007 0.97
Number of prisons  0.213 0.79 0.0230 0.82 0.0238 0.51 0.0246 0.73 0.0405 0.82 0.0060 0.28 -0.0042 -0.15
Number of attempts on a person’s life  0.002 0.03 -0.0332 -1.95 -0.0335 -1.93 -0.0569 -2.99 -0.0572 -2.96 -0.0076 -0.81 -0.0079 -0.85
Number of attacks against wealth  0.089 1.50 0.0195 1.20 0.0200 0.93 0.0294 1.62 0.0291 1.26 0.0031 0.37 0.0015 0.14
Number of bars  0.003 0.04 0.0070 0.45 0.0091 0.59 0.0043 0.26 0.0079 0.48 0.0143 1.77 0.0150 1.82
Number of brothels  -0.083 -1.60 0.0060 0.34 0.0014 0.06 0.0185 0.99 0.0123 0.50 -0.0117 -1.13 -0.0107 -0.86
Number of casinos/places for bets  0.043 0.72 0.0017 0.09 -0.0033 -0.16 -0.0149 -0.73 -0.0205 -0.96 -0.0061 -0.58 -0.0078 -0.71
Number of places selling drugs/narcotics  -0.050 -1.09 -0.0330 -2.00 -0.0393 -2.38 -0.0354 -2.03 -0.0408 -2.39 0.0002 0.02 0.0008 0.08
Share of Teenage Mothers in Census Sector 5.892 2.43




0.6508 0.6382 0.6361 0.6348






Ln house price 
/2 Ln house rent
O L S2 S L SO L S 2 S L S O L S 2 S L S Variable
Homicide Rate Ln house price 
/1
 
All regressions include dummy variable of father and mother's education levels and their 
interactions. t statistics computed based on robust standard errors corrected by clustering at 
the census sector level. 1/ Cadastral values if available, otherwise, the value reported by 
households surveyed.  2/ Only includes households for which cadastral values are available. 
Sources: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003, Real State Appraisal of Bogotá, National 
Police-DIJIN 2000, Paz Pública (2000). Colombian 1993 Population Census. 
* Dummy variable equal to one if house, zero otherwise (apartment, etc.). 
** Attacks by 
guerrilla groups Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN, or other groups. 
*** A-Theoretical estimation of QoL (See 
methodology in DNP, 1997). 
****  Centros de Atención Inmediata,  CAIS: Centers of 
Immediate -Police- Attention.  At the census sector level.   26
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we use hedonic price models to estimate the value households located in the 
city of Bogotá (Colombia) are willing to pay to avoid crime, and in particular, to avoid high 
homicides rates. We find that households living in the highest socioeconomic stratum 
(stratum 6) are willing to pay up to 7.0% of their house values to avoid an increase of the 
homicide rate in one standard deviation. Households in stratum 5 are willing to pay up to 
2.8% of their house values, and those in stratum 4 up to 4.4%. 
 
The results reveal the willingness to pay for security by households in Bogotá, and, 
additionally, reveal the emergence of urban private markets that auction security. These 
markets imply different levels of access to public goods among the population, and, in fact, 
the exclusion of the poorest. We find, as well, evidence of negative capitalization of 
aggravated assaults, and of positive capitalization of the presence of police authority in the 
form of Centers of Immediate Attention, (CAIs).   27
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